Message Text

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

-----043819 151235Z/50

O 151124Z JUL 78

FM AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 4197
INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 TEL AVIV 8960

EXDIS DIST AS NODIS

LONDON FOR SAUNDERS AND ATHERTON

BONN FOR SECRETARY'S PARTY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PEPR, IS, EG, US

SUBJECT: US TACTICS FOR THE LONDON CONFERENCE

REF: TEL AVIV 8856

1. OUR MINIMUM GOAL AT LONDON IS AGREEMENT ON THE PART OF ISRAEL AND EGYPT TO A CONTINUATION OF DIRECT TALKS, PLACE AND DATE TO BE SPECIFICALLY STATED ON JULY 19.
HOWEVER, AS WE HAVE REPORTED (REFTEL) DAYAN AND HIS COLLEAGUES WILL GO TO LONDON SUSPICIOUS OF US MOTIVES.
THEREFORE, RECOMMEND THAT INITIAL US-GOI BILATERAL INVOLVE ONLY PRINCIPALS PLUS ONE AIDE FOR EACH, TO PROMOTE CANDOR FROM DAYAN. FAST-MOVING EVENTS OF PAST WEEK HAVE LEFT DAYAN IN EXTREMELY AWKWARD SPOT WHICH WILL AFFECT HIS APPROACH TO LONDON TALKS. FIRST PRIORITY IS FOR SECRETARY TO TALK FRANKLY WITH HIM ABOUT HOW GOI IS NOW APPROACHING TALKS IN WAKE OF WEIZMAN/SADAT MEETING. SECRET

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2. IN THAT MEETING, SECRETARY COULD ALSO ASSURE DAYAN IN THE STRAIGHTEST POSSIBLE WAY THAT, DESPITE MULTIPLICITOUS PRESS REPORTS TO THE CONTRARY, THE US CONTINUED TO BE AN EVENHANDED PARTICIPANT IN THE MIDDLE EAST EXERCISE. WE HAD NOT COLLUDED WITH SADAT NOR WOULD WE. WE ARE DELIGHTED THAT EGYPT AND ISRAEL ARE AGAIN TALK-

ING DIRECTLY WITHOUT US. WE WILL INTERJECT OUR OWN IDEAS INTO THE PROCESS ONLY IF ALL ELSE FAILED. WASHINGTON IS CERTAINLY NOT EAGER TO DO SOMETHING FOR THE TWO SIDES WHICH THEY COULD DO FOR ONE ANOTHER. DIRECT US INTERVENTION WILL BE A LAST RESORT.

- 3. WE SUFFER UNDER NO ILLUSIONS THAT SUCH A DIRECT AND UNEQUIVOCAL STATEMENT FROM THE SECRTARY TO DAYAN WILL IMMEDIATELY REASSURE THE ISRAELIS. BUT IT COULD DO SOMETHING TO IMPROVE DAYAN'S CONFIDENCE IN US BEFORE THE TRILATERAL TALKS GET UNDERWAY.
- 4. AS FOR THE SUBSTANTIVE EXCHANGES WHICH WILL TAKE PLACE BETWEEN THE TWO SIDES, WASHINGTON IS PROBABLY NOW BUSILY SEEKING COMMON THREADS. DAYAN PUBLICLY AFFIRMED JULY 13 THAT SUCH OVERLAP EXISTS. INDEED WEIZMAN'S DRAMATIC MEETING WITH SADAT WILL MAKE DAYAN MORE EAGER TO MAKE THE LONDON MEETING A SUCCESS.
- 5. THE FOLLOWING ARE SOME THOUGHTS ABOUT HOW TO POINT KAMEL AND DAYAN IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION. FEEDING EACH SIDE QUESTIONS THEY WOULD ASK THE OTHER SEEMS TO US TOO INTERVENTIONIST AT THIS STAGE, BUT WE COULD DEVELOP IN THE INITIAL BILATERAL MEETINGS SOME CENTRAL THEMES WHICH COULD BE PURSUED. THIS COULD LEAD BOTH SIDES TO PRESENT MORE FORTHCOMING "ORAL INTERPRETATIONS" SECRET

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ASSOCIATED WITH THEIR RESPECTIVE PLANS. IT MIGHT ALSO BE USEFUL IN THE BILATERALS TO NOTE AREAS WHERE WE BELIEVE DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE FRUITLESS AND EVEN SELF-DEFEATING FOR THE TIME BEING.

6. AT THE RISK OF DUPLICATING WORK ALREADY UNDOUBTEDLY DONE IN WASHINGTON, WE LIST THE FOLLOWING ISSUES WHICH, IN OUR JUDGEMENT, OFFER SOME DEGREE OF OVERLAP BETWEEN THE EGYPTIANS AND THE ISRAELIS AT THIS STAGE:

A. THE NATURE OF PEACE: ISRAEL SEES PEACE AS ENCOMPASSING THE FULL RANGE OF NORMAL RELATIONS. THE EGYPTIANS HAVE PUBLICLY ALSO EMBRACED THIS VIEW. SINCE THIS POINT IS NOT SPELLED OUT IN THE PROPOSAL, THIS WOULD BE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DAYAN AND KAMEL TO FIND AN INTRODUCTORY AREA OF AGREEMTN OUTSIDE THE TEXT OF THE TWO PROPOSAL.

B. SECURITY: ISRAEL HAS STATED THAT SECURITY IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WILL BE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF THE ISRAELI AUTHORITIES (POINT 11 OF SELF-RULE PLAN). EGYPT HAS STATED THAT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JUST AND LASTING PEACE

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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 W

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INFO AMEMBASSY BONN IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

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EXDIS DIST AS NODIS

IN THE MIDDLE EAST NECESSITATES INTER ALIA TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION THE LEGITIMATE SECURITY CONCERNS OF THE PARTIES (POINT 1 OF EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL). ALSO, THERE SHOULD BE TALKS BETWEEN EGYPT, JORDAN AND ISRAEL AND REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE ON MUTUAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS FOR ALL THE PARTIES CONCERNED DURING AND AFTER THE TRANSITIONAL PERIOD (POINT 3). DAYAN COULD PURSUE WITH KAMEL THE QUESTION OF WHAT SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS EGYPT BELIEVES SHOULD SATISFY ISRAEL'S SECURITY CONCERNS ON THE WEST BANK, ESPECIALLY PROBING HOW EGYPTIANS PROPOSE TO ASSURE ISRAEL'S SECURITY AGAINST TERRORIST ACTIVITY, NOT JUST EXTERNAL AGGRESSION. KAMEL COULD ASK DAYAN THE SIZE, LOCATIONS AND ACTIVI-TIES OF AN IDF MILITARY PRESENCE AND/OR EARLY WARNING STATIONS OR OTHER SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS ISRAEL WOULD DESIRE, EGYPT HAS PROPOSED THAT IT AND JORDAN SHALL GUARANTEE THAT THE SECUIRTY ARRANGEMENTS TO BE AGREED UPON WILL CONTINUE TO BE RESPECTED IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. DAYAN COULD INQUIRE OF KAMEL WHAT KIND OF GUARANTEE EGYPT IS SPECIFICALLY CONSIDERING.

C. THE SELF-RULE/TRANSITIONAL PHASE (INTERIM PERIOD) FOR SECRET

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THE WEST BANK AND GAZA:

--ISRAEL STATES THAT THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SELF-RULE PLAN WILL BE SUBJECT TO REVIEW AFTER A FIVE-YEAR PERIOD (POINT 26). THIS POINT IS ELABORATED BY THE GOI IN ITS JUNE 18 ANSWER TO THE US QUESTIONS. THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL STATES THAT THERE SHOULD BE A TRANSITIONAL PERIOD NOT EXCEEDING FIVE YEARS (POINT 2). KAMEL CAN ASK DAYAN TO EXPAND UPON THE CABINET'S DECISION AND THIS COULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE LATTER TO PRESENT THE ISRAELI ORAL INTERPRETATIONS.

--THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL STATES THAT JORDAN SHALL HAVE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE WEST BANK (POINT 5). THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL PROVIDES FOR A POSSIBLE ROLE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA FOR JORDAN IN POINTS 14, 17, 18, 19, 21 AND 23. DAYAN COULD USEFULLY PURSUE WITH KAMEL THE EGYPTIAN VIEW OF THE JORDANIAN ROLE ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. THIS IS SOMETHING DAYAN HIMSELF IS QUITE INTERESTED IN AND KAMEL CAN EXPLORE HIS IDEAS ON THIS SUBJECT.

--THE EGYPTIAN PROPOSAL STATES THAT FREELY ELECTED REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE SHALL EXERCISE DIRECT AUTHORITY OVER THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA (POINT 5). THE ISRAELI PROPOSAL SUGGESTS THAT THE RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WILL ELECT AN ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (POINT 3) AND THAT ALL ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS RELATING TO THE ARAB RESIDENTS OF THE WEST BANK AND AUTHORITY WILL BE UNDER THE DIRECTION AND WITHIN THE COMPETENCE OF THIS ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL (POINT 9). THINGS WOULD MOVE ALONG IF KAMEL WERE WILLING TO INDICATE IN WHAT FORM EGYPT SEES THE PALESTINIANS EXERCISING AUTHORITY OVER THE ADSECRET

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MINISTRATION OF THE EST BANK AND GAZA.

--EGYPT STATES THAT THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT ON THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WILL BE ABOLISHED AT THE OUTSET OF THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE (POINT 5). ISRAEL STATES THAT, UPON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PEACE, THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA WILL BE ABOLISHED (TITLE AND POINT 1). KAMEL COULD ASK DAYAN IF THE ADMINISTRATION OF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT AND THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IN ITS ENTIRETY ARE IDENTICAL. IN ADDITION, HE CAN PURSUE WITH DAYAN HOW ISRAEL WOULD BE RESPONSIBLE FOR PUBLIC ORDER (POINT 11) IF THE MILITARY GOVERNMENT IS TO BE ABOLISHED AND NOT CONTRADICT THE PRINCPLE OF NON-INTERFERENCE IN THE DAILY LIFE OF WEST BANKERS AND GAZANS.

7. TOPICS WHICH IF BROUGHT UP ARE LIABLE TO LEAD DAYAN AND KAMEL INTO CUL-DE-SAC INCLUDING WITHDRAWAL, UN INVOLVEMENT IN AN INTERIM PERIOD, IMPLEMENTATION OF UN RESOLUTIONS ON PALESTINIAN REFUGEES AND SETTLEMENTS. NEVERTHELESS, THEY WILL PROBABLY RAISE SOME OF THESE ISSUES AND WILL RESENT ANY EFFORTS TO DELIMIT THE AGENDA. DAYAN, FOR EXAMPLE, MAY WANT TO EXPLORE EGYPTIAN VIEWS AND/OR PRESENT THE ISRAELI CASE ON JEWISH LAND PURCHASE IN THE WEST BANK AND GAZA, SETTLEMENTS, A UNITED JERUSALEM AND THE NATURE OF THE "RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIAN PEOPLE".

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X Capture Date: 01 jan 1994 Channel Indicators: n/a

Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED

Concepts: DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATIONS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS, CAT-B

Control Number: n/a Copy: SINGLE Draft Date: 15 jul 1978 Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960 Decaption Note: Disposition Action: RELEASED Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW

Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014 Disposition Event:

Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978TELAV08960
Document Source: CORE

Document Unique ID: 00 Drafter: n/a

Enclosure: n/a Executive Order: GS Errors: N/A **Expiration:**

Film Number: P840157-2617 Format: TEL

From: TEL AVIV Handling Restrictions: n/a

Image Path: ISecure: 1

Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780755/aaaabumc.tel

Line Count: 236 Litigation Code IDs: Litigation Codes:

Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 6c058072-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Office: ACTION NODS

Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, EXDIS

Page Count: 5
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a Previous Classification: SECRET Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS, EXDIS Reference: 78 TEL AVIV 8856

Retention: 0

Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED Review Content Flags:

Review Date: 10 jun 2005 Review Event: Review Exemptions: n/a **Review Media Identifier:** Review Release Date: n/a Review Release Event: n/a **Review Transfer Date:** Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a

SAS ID: 1993876 Secure: OPEN Status: NATIVE

Subject: US TACTICS FOR THE LONDON CONFERENCE

TAGS: PEPR, PBOR, US, UK, IS, EG To: STATE BONN MULTIPLE

Type: TE

vdkvgwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/6c058072-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc

Review Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014

Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014